

Message Text

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INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 GENEVA 11913

EXDIS

USSALTTWO

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS:PARM
SUBJECT: MINISTER SEMENOV'S PLENARY STATEMENT
DECEMBER 9, 1977 (SALT TWO-1542)

BEGIN TEXT.

- SEMENOV STATEMENT, DECEMBER 9, 1977

- I

IN ITS STATEMENT AT THE DECEMBER 1, 1977 MEETING THE
USSR DELEGATION PRESENTED DETAILED AND THOROUGHLY WEIGHED
RATIONALE IN SUPPORT OF THE SOVIET SIDE'S APPROACH TO
THE QUESTION OF BANNING NEW TYPES OF ICBMS AND SLBMS--
UNDER ARTICLE II OF THE PROTOCOL TO THE TREATY.

TODAY I WOULD LIKE TO ADD THE FOLLOWING.

ESTABLISHMENT OF EFFECTIVE AND MEANINGFUL OBLIGA-
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TIONS AIMED AT BANNING THE FLIGHT-TESTING AND DEPLOY-
MENT OF NEW TYPES OF ICBMS AND SLBMS IS TO BECOME A
NEW MAJOR STEP IN THE PROCESS OF CURBING THE RACE IN
STRATEGIC ARMS, STRENGTHENING STRATEGIC STABILITY AND
REDUCING THE THREAT OF NUCLEAR WAR.

IT IS PRECISELY THIS, IN ACCORDANCE WITH EXISTING

UNDERSTANDINGS BETWEEN THE SIDES, THAT IS THE GOAL OF THE PROVISIONS BEING WORKED OUT BY THE DELEGATIONS FOR ARTICLE II OF THE PROTOCOL.

IN THE COURSE OF THIS WORK IT BECOMES NECESSARY TO REACH AGREEMENT ON THE DEFINITION OF NEW TYPES OF ICBMS AND SLBMS FOR THE PURPOSES OF THE LIMITATIONS BEING ESTABLISHED UNDER THIS ARTICLE OF THE PROTOCOL.

THE SOVIET PROPOSAL ADVANCED IN THIS CONNECTION, BASED ON SPECIFYING THE YEAR 1976 AS THE CUT-OFF DATE AFTER WHICH ALL TYPES OF ICBMS AND SLBMS, SHOULD THE FLIGHT-TESTS OF THESE MISSILES BE INITIATED AFTER THAT DATE, WOULD BE INCLUDED AS THE NEW TYPES BEING BANNED FOR THE TERM OF THE PROTOCOL, ENSURES A CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS UNDERSTANDING OF THE BOUNDS AND SCOPE OF THE RELEVANT OBLIGATIONS OF THE SIDES.

THE CRITERION INCORPORATED IN THE SOVIET PROPOSAL, IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE RELEVANT ALREADY AGREED PROVISIONS OF THE DRAFT, IN PARTICULAR THOSE OF ARTICLE II, PAR. 5, OF THE TREATY, PROVIDES THE SIDES WITH EVERYTHING NECESSARY TO HAVE, AS A RESULT OF OBSERVATIONS CARRIED OUT BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS OF VERIFICATION, AN ACCURATE PICTURE OF WHICH TYPES OF ICBMS AND SLBMS WOULD BE INCLUDED AMONG NEW TYPES AND THUS BE SUBJECT
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TO THE BAN.

A CRITERION ENVISAGING SOME SORT OF TIME LIMIT IN CONNECTION WITH LIMITATIONS BEING ESTABLISHED ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS WAS ALREADY USED IN ARTICLE II OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT AND, AS YOU KNOW, HAS BEEN SUCCESSFULLY PROVEN IN PRACTICE.

PRECISELY SUCH A CRITERION INVOLVING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A SPECIFIC DATE IS ALSO USED BY THE SIDES IN THE AGREED DEFINITION OF MODERN SLBMS IN CONNECTION WITH ARTICLE II, PAR. 2, OF THE TREATY UNDER PREPARATION. THIS HAS BEEN AGREED.

THE U.S. DRAFT OF ARTICLE II OF THE PROTOCOL ALSO REFERS TO A DATE.

A DIFFERENT APPROACH, ONE WHICH WOULD INTRODUCE ELEMENTS UNRELATED TO THE TASK, WOULD ONLY LEAD TO AN ARBITRARY AND SUBJECTIVE INTERPRETATION OF THE LIMITA-

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TIONS BEING WORKED OUT IN THIS CONNECTION, WITH ALL THE
NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES ENSUING THEREFROM.

THE PROPOSALS OF THE SOVIET SIDE REGARDING THE
CONTENT OF ARTICLE II ITSELF OF THE PROTOCOL WHICH WILL
REMAIN IN FORCE FOR THREE YEARS ARE ALSO FULLY CONSISTENT
WITH THE OBJECTIVES AND TASKS OF THE ONGOING NEGOTIATIONS.

THE SOVIET SIDE PROPOSES THAT AN OBLIGATION BE
ASSUMED NOT TO FLIGHT-TEST NEW TYPES OF ICBMS EQUIPPED
WITH MIRVS, OR DEPLOY SUCH NEW TYPES OF ICBMS. AS WE
UNDERSTAND IT, THE U.S. SIDE, TOO, HAS THE SAME OBJECTIVE
IN MIND.

CONTINUING TO ADHERE TO THIS POSITION, THE SOVIET
SIDE DEEMED IT POSSIBLE, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE CON-
SIDERATIONS EXPRESSED HERE, TO MOVE TOWARD THE U.S.
POSITION, BY PROVIDING UNDER ARTICLE II, PAR. 1, OF THE
PROTOCOL FOR A BAN ON THE FLIGHT-TESTING AND DEPLOYMENT
OF NEW TYPES OF ICBMS EQUIPPED WITH SINGLE REENTRY
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VEHICLES, AS WELL, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF ONE SUCH NEW

TYPE OF ICBM FOR EACH SIDE. THIS IS A COMPROMISE, A
CONSTRUCTIVE STEP BY THE SOVIET SIDE, WHICH MAKES POS-
SIBLE A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION IN THIS AREA.

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IN THIS CONNECTION, I WISH TO EXPLAIN THE FOLLOWING.

FOR THE USSR THIS IS CAUSED BY THE NEED TO DEVELOP
A NEW ICBM WITH A SINGLE REENTRY VEHICLE TO REPLACE
AGING ICBMS HAVING SUCH REENTRY VEHICLES, SINCE THEIR
PREVIOUSLY PLANNED REPLACEMENT BY MISSILES OF THE RS-16
AND RS-18 TYPES WITH SINGLE REENTRY VEHICLES CANNOT BE
CARRIED OUT DUE TO THE FACT THAT--CONTINGENT UPON REACH-
ING MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS WITH RESPECT TO CRUISE
MISSILES AND OTHER UNRESOLVED QUESTIONS--THESE TYPES OF
MISSILES ARE INCLUDED AMONG DELIVERY VEHICLES EQUIPPED
WITH MIRVS.

I WOULD LIKE TO STRESS MOST EMPHATICALLY THAT THE
SOLUTION BEING PROPOSED BY THE SOVIET SIDE, WHICH PRO-
VIDES FOR A BAN ON THE FLIGHT-TESTING AND DEPLOYMENT OF
ALL NEW TYPES OF ICBMS, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF ONE NEW
TYPE OF SUCH MISSILES EQUIPPED WITH SINGLE REENTRY VEHI-
CLES, IS THE FIRM POSITION OF THE SOVIET SIDE ON THIS
QUESTION.

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TAKING INTO ACCOUNT CERTAIN CONSIDERATIONS EXPRESSED BY THE U.S. SIDE REGARDING THE POSSIBILITY OF INSTALLING SELF-CONTAINED DISPENSING MECHANISMS ON ICBMS EQUIPPED WITH SINGLE REENTRY VEHICLES, THE SOVIET SIDE STATED THAT BANNING THE EQUIPPING OF NEW TYPES OF ICBMS WITH INDEPENDENTLY TARGETABLE REENTRY VEHICLES ALSO IMPLIES BANNING INSTALLATION THEREON OF THE SELF-CONTAINED DISPENSING MECHANISMS OR OTHER ASSEMBLIES, MENTIONED IN THE AGREED STATEMENT TO ARTICLE II, PAR. 5, OF THE TREATY.

- THE SOVIET PROPOSALS TABLED ALSO PROVIDE FOR OBLIGATIONS ON BANNING NEW TYPES OF SLBMS EQUIPPED WITH MIRVS--UNDER ARTICLE II, PAR. 2, OF THE PROTOCOL.

IN THIS CONNECTION, THERE IS AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE TO THE EFFECT THAT WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE PROVISION OF PAR. 2 OF THAT ARTICLE OF THE PROTOCOL AN EXCEPTION WILL BE MADE FOR EACH SIDE WITH RESPECT TO THE FLIGHT-TESTING AND DEPLOYMENT OF ONE NEW TYPE OF SLBM EQUIPPED WITH MIRVS.

ON THE BASIS OF THE ACTUAL STATE OF AFFAIRS IN THIS AREA, THE SOVIET SIDE STATED THAT FOR THE USSR THIS EXCEPTION MUST BE THE RSM-52 SLBM. AS STATED HERE, THE RSM-52 MISSILE IS A MIRVED SLBM, BEING DEVELOPED FOR MISSILE SUBMARINES OF THE TYPHOON TYPE, SIMILAR TO THE U.S. TRIDENT C-4 MIRVED SLBM, BEING DEVELOPED FOR MISSILE SUBMARINES OF THE OHIO TYPE. AS YOU KNOW, MUCH WORK HAS BEEN DONE ON BOTH OF THE AFOREMENTIONED SLBMS, FOR WHICH A CORRESPONDING EXCEPTION WILL BE MADE IN THE CONTEXT OF ARTICLE II, PAR. 2, OF

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THE PROTOCOL.

THE QUESTION OF MODERNIZATION HAS BEEN RAISED HERE IN THIS CONTEXT.

I WOULD LIKE TO NOTE THAT THE AGREED PROVISIONS OF THE TREATY BEING WORKED OUT, WHILE PROVIDING FOR THE RIGHT OF THE SIDES TO MODERNIZE AND REPLACE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, ALSO ESTABLISH LIMITS AND BOUNDS FOR SUCH MODERNIZATION.

THE DRAFT TREATY BEING NEGOTIATED PROVIDES, IN
PARTICULAR, FOR AN OBLIGATION OF THE SIDES NOT TO CON-

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VERT LAUNCHERS OF LIGHT ICBMS, OR ICBMS OF OLDER TYPES
DEPLOYED PRIOR TO 1964, INTO LAUNCHERS OF HEAVY ICBMS
OF TYPES DEPLOYED AFTER THAT TIME; THE OBLIGATION, IN
THE PROCESS OF MODERNIZATION AND REPLACEMENT, NOT TO
INCREASE THE ORIGINAL INTERNAL VOLUME OF AN ICBM SILO
LAUNCHER BY MORE THAN 32 PERCENT; AND THE OBLIGATION
NOT TO DEVELOP, TEST OR DEPLOY ICBMS WHICH HAVE A
LAUNCH-WEIGHT GREATER OR A THROW-WEIGHT GREATER THAN
THAT OF THE HEAVIEST, IN TERMS OF EITHER LAUNCH-WEIGHT
OR THROW-WEIGHT, RESPECTIVELY, OF THE HEAVY ICBMS
DEPLOYED BY EITHER SIDE AS OF THE DATE OF SIGNATURE OF
THE TREATY, ETC.

THE SOVIET SIDE'S POSITION IS THAT MODERNIZATION
OF EXISTING MISSILES, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE RELEVANT
PROVISIONS OF THE DRAFT TREATY AND ARTICLE II OF THE
PROTOCOL, WHICH IS UNDER NEGOTIATION, WOULD BE CARRIED
OUT WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE AGREED LIMITATIONS IN
THIS AREA AND WOULD BE LIMITED TO THE TYPES OF ICBMS AND
SLBMS THE SIDES POSSESS.

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THIS MEANS ESTABLISHING EFFECTIVE LIMITATIONS ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, IN QUALITATIVE TERMS AS WELL.

IN THIS CONNECTION, I WOULD LIKE TO EMPHASIZE ONCE AGAIN THAT REACHING AGREEMENT ON THE LIMITATIONS UNDER ARTICLE II OF THE PROTOCOL MUST NOT MEAN ESTABLISHING A BAN ON MODERNIZATION AND REPLACEMENT OF EXISTING TYPES OF ICBMS AND SLBMS, OR OPEN THE DOOR TO ARBITRARILY INCLUDING AMONG THE NEW TYPES OF ICBMS AND SLBMS BEING BANNED THE SIDES' EXISTING TYPES OF ICBMS AND SLBMS, WHICH ARE BEING MODERNIZED IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE TREATY BEING NEGOTIATED.

MODERNIZATION OF EXISTING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS IS AN OBJECTIVE PROCESS. THE VERY FACT THAT THE SIDES HAVE STRATEGIC ARMS PRESUPPOSES THE POSSIBILITY AND NECESSITY OF MODERNIZING THEM, NATURALLY, IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE RELEVANT LIMITATIONS MENTIONED ABOVE.

ON THE OTHER HAND, IF WE WERE TO TAKE THE PATH OF INCLUDING IN THE DEFINITION IN CONNECTION WITH ARTICLE II OF THE PROTOCOL A CRITERION BASED ON CHANGES IN MISSILE COMPONENTS OR THE COMBINATION OF SUCH COMPONENTS, THEN, AS ALREADY NOTED HERE, INSTEAD OF BANNING NEW TYPES OF ICBMS AND SLBMS, WHICH IS WHAT MUST BE DEALT WITH, THIS WOULD PROVIDE FOR SOMETHING ENTIRELY DIFFERENT, NAMELY BANNING THE MODERNIZATION AND REPLACEMENT OF EXISTING TYPES OF ICBMS AND SLBMS.

AN EFFORT TO LIMIT ONE OF THE SIDES IN AN AREA WHERE LIMITATIONS WHICH, ON THE FACE OF IT, ARE THE SAME, DUE TO THE SPECIFICS OF DEVELOPMENT, THE GEOGRAPHICAL SITUATION AND THE TIME FACTOR, WOULD IN REALITY HAVE INCOM-

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PARABLY LESS SIGNIFICANT CONSEQUENCES FOR THE OTHER SIDE, WOULD BE NOTHING BUT AN ATTEMPT TO OBTAIN OBVIOUS UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE, CONTRARY TO THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY AND EQUAL SECURITY, ADOPTED AT THE NEGOTIATIONS.

IT IS NATURALLY IMPOSSIBLE TO AGREE WITH THIS.

IN CONCLUSION I WOULD LIKE TO EMPHASIZE AGAIN THAT THE PROPOSALS TABLED BY THE SOVIET SIDE CONSTITUTE A MAJOR STEP IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ONGOING NEGOTIATIONS AND PROVIDE A BASIS FOR WORKING OUT EFFECTIVE OBLIGATIONS ON BANNING NEW TYPES OF ICBMS AND SLBMS FOR THE TERM OF

THE PROTOCOL.

INJECTING INTO THE FABRIC OF THE NEGOTIATIONS AN APPROACH WHICH IN ESSENCE MEANS A COMPLETE BAN ON MODERNIZATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS IN PLACE OF THE ALREADY AGREED LIMITATIONS IN THIS AREA CANNOT BUT LEAD TO UPSETTING THE BALANCE OF INTERESTS OF THE SIDES AND TO PILING UP UNNECESSARY OBSTACLES TO COMPLETION OF THE CONSTRUCTIVE WORK ON THE DRAFT TEXT OF THE DOCUMENT UNDER PREPARATION.

IN CONNECTION WITH THE ABOVE, THE USSR DELEGATION WOULD LIKE TO EMPHASIZE AGAIN THAT FURTHER MEASURES FOR THE QUALITATIVE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, INCLUDING THE QUESTION OF AGREED LIMITATIONS ON MODERNIZATION OF EXISTING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, WILL BE THE SUBJECT OF SUBSEQUENT NEGOTIATIONS.

IT IS CLEAR FROM THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE DRAFT TEXT OF THE JOINT STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES FOR SUBSEQUENT NEGOTIATIONS ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, WHICH HAVE BEEN TABLED FOR DISCUSSION, THAT THERE IS MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING ON THIS

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SCORE.

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II

MR. AMBASSADOR,

- IN THE COURSE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS BEING CONDUCTED
HERE REFERENCE HAS BEEN REPEATEDLY MADE TO THE QUESTION
OF DATA BASE, I. E., DATA ON THE NUMBERS, BY CATEGORY,
OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS THE SIDES HAVE AS OF THE
DATE OF SIGNATURE OF THE TREATY.

- IN CONSIDERING THE U.S. PROPOSAL ON THIS SCORE,
WE TOOK INTO ACCOUNT THE CONSIDERATIONS EXPRESSED HERE,
TO THE EFFECT THAT DISCUSSION OF THE QUESTION OF DATA
BASE WOULD MAKE THE NEGOTIATIONS OF THE DELEGATIONS MORE
PRODUCTIVE AND EFFECTIVE AS REGARDS CERTAIN OTHER PRO-
VISIONS OF THE DRAFT, WHICH ARE BEFORE US.

IN THIS CONTEXT THE USSR DELEGATION HAS TO STATE
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THAT THE QUESTION OF EXCHANGING DATA ON THE NUMBER OF
STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS THE SIDES HAVE, WHICH WAS RAISED
BY THE U.S. SIDE, COULD BE RESOLVED BY EXCHANGING SUCH
DATA AT THE LEVEL OF DELEGATIONS, WHEN WE COMPLETE WORK-
ING OUT THE DRAFT TREATY AND THE PROTOCOL THERETO.

OF COURSE, FIRST WE SHOULD DISCUSS THE QUESTION
OF THE CATEGORIES OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS BEING
LIMITED UNDER THE TREATY, ON WHICH THERE WOULD BE A DATA
BASE EXCHANGE.

GUIDED BY THE INTERESTS OF ENSURING PROGRESS AT THE
NEGOTIATIONS, THE SOVIET SIDE PROPOSES THAT THE ARMS
ON WHICH THERE COULD BE A DATA BASE EXCHANGE INCLUDE THE
FOLLOWING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS:

- -- LAUNCHERS OF ICBMS;
- FIXED LAUNCHERS OF ICBMS;
- LAUNCHERS OF ICBMS EQUIPPED WITH MIRVS;
- LAUNCHERS OF SLBMS;
- LAUNCHERS OF SLBMS EQUIPPED WITH MIRVS;
- HEAVY BOMBERS;
- -- HEAVY BOMBERS EQUIPPED FOR CRUISE MISSILES
- CAPABLE OF A RANGE IN EXCESS OF 600 KILOMETERS;

-- HEAVY BOMBERS EQUIPPED ONLY FOR ASBMS;

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-- ASBMS.

THE SOVIET SIDE BELIEVES THAT THE LIST, SUBMITTED BY THE USSR DELEGATION, OF THE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS ON WHICH A DATA BASE EXCHANGE COULD TAKE PLACE AT THE LEVEL OF DELEGATIONS WHEN WE COMPLETE WORKING OUT THE DRAFT TREATY AND THE PROTOCOL THERETO, IS FULLY CONSISTENT WITH THE SCOPE OF THE OBLIGATIONS WHICH WILL BE ESTABLISHED FOR THE SIDES UNDER THE DOCUMENT BEING PREPARED. EARLE

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